The importance of cultural understanding for OSINT

Speaker 1: Welcome to The World of Intelligence, a podcast for you to discover the latest analysis of global military and security trends within the open source defense intelligence community. Now, onto the episode, with your host, Harry Kemsley.

Harry Kemsley: Hello, and welcome to this edition of World of Intelligence from Janes, your host, Harry Kemsley. And, as always, my co- host, Sean Corbett. Hello, Sean.

Sean Corbett: Hi, Harry.

Harry Kemsley: So, Sean, we've spoken several times about things in terms of the considerations around using open sources for the derivation of intelligence. And we've talked in the past about things like ethics, for example, and empathy. We've also touched on the culture of organizations, as well as culture as a matter of language as well, in that conversation we had before Christmas. So I thought today we would spend a bit of time specifically focusing on this word culture. And I'm absolutely delighted to welcome a guest who knows a great deal about culture, Satgin Hamrah. Hello, Satgin.

Satgin Hamrah: Hello, thank you for having me. It's a pleasure to be here with you today.

Harry Kemsley: It's a real pleasure to have you on the podcast, and thank you so much for joining. So to get us started, Satgin, for all of us, the listeners and the three of us, could you, in your own words, describe your views of what culture actually is?

Satgin Hamrah: In a nutshell, a culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and the significance of either visual or linguistic artifacts that really bring the people together. And there's a sense of commonality between a collective, in regards to those things. These shape how people think, their perceptions, how they feel, and how they process things. It could be on the smallest micro level, a telephone conversation, to activities of another country in regards to their state. So it's very significant. And the significance of understanding culture is immense because it impacts, again, how history is perceived, analyzed, and used. And on the other hand, cultural history, or the relationship between history and culture, also is highly impactful on a granular level and on a state level. So the level of impact that it has is tangible, but the most important components of it is its intangibility.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, yeah. And would it be fair to say that when you begin to understand a culture, you begin to understand the minds of the audience you're talking to, and how they might react to certain things? I sense from what you've said that you could have a sense of uniformity in your expectations, your assumptions, about how a specific culture might react an external stimulus. Is that fair?

Satgin Hamrah: It is fair. Then, when we're talking about it from that angle, we're looking at it from a main umbrella culture. But then under that main umbrella cultures, you have subcultures. So if you're looking, for example, at a state, whether again through a diplomatic, the eyes of diplomacy, or the eyes of intelligence, then when you have the main umbrella, you have main subsections of culture, then you have to break them down into even smaller levels, like smaller silos, if we can say that, in order to be able to understand it within that context.

Harry Kemsley: And would it then be fair to say that, with that level of understanding of those siloed subcultures, you can begin to understand why certain subcultures are reacting the way they are? You can use that as a means of helping you interpret what you're seeing and hearing.

Satgin Hamrah: Yes, but you also need to contextualize it on other levels as well, especially if you're looking at certain... It depends on the region. So if you want to look at the cultural silos, you have to contextualize it in terms of any bridges they have with other cultural silos, and how other stimuli influence it as well, because it's dynamic. But there are silos, but there are bridges between them.

Harry Kemsley: Understood. Now, Sean, you and I have both been in operational environments. I remember standing in an operational headquarters, staring at a situation that was developing on the screen. Having to the left of me, a legal advisor, and only latterly, actually, but in this particular operation, did I ever see what might've been described as a cultural advisor, trying to help me understand what I was seeing, as Satgin just said, in terms of context. Have you had much experience of working with cultural advice in an operational environment?

Sean Corbett: Yeah, very closely, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. So I think we belatedly, in the military, learned that you, without at least some sort of understanding of the culture in which you are operating, you couldn't hope to understand the behaviors, in terms of why are they acting how they're acting? And so, inevitably, middle- aged, white male, I think through the lens of Western middle- aged, white male. But you can't apply the same logic about how we think as how other people think. So very, very quickly, in my day out there, they were just developing what we call the coolants, they were the cultural advisors then. Now, although they were good, some of them were very good, it wasn't until... And they might have had the best degrees ever in a particular culture. But the best ones were undoubtedly those that we got from that environment because it was part of their culture. So there are many instances where, had we not had that input, we'd have probably got it badly wrong, in terms of how we were dealing with people, what the outcome would've been.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. Satgin, I'll come to you in just a moment, in terms of its importance to the security context, which, of course, is really the audience that we're talking to for a large part. But I do remember a situation in my own time, when staring at a group of military- age males, standing in a location, firing AK- 47s into the air. There was an immediate cry of, " Target, target, target," when actually it was a wedding celebration happening. And the celebrations included firing weapons into the sky, which culturally was opaque to me. And, yet, to the cultural advisor that I had laterally, it was an immediate, " Wait a second, that looks like a wedding to me." So let's turn then, Satgin, to the importance of this cultural sensitivity and understanding to the security context from your own experience. What's your guidance for a listener who is in the security environment, and their thoughts about how they might apply their understanding, or their desire to understand culture?

Satgin Hamrah: Depends on, I think, the importance of the intangible aspect of a culture perhaps varies according to the region. So if you're looking at, for example, the Middle East, it's essential to have a deep, historical understanding of, not just the region or the state, but the smaller region that you're in. And how that influences their culture, and levels of perception, and their beliefs. So that's on a more macro level. Culture impacts, those perceptions will impact their national identity, their ethnic identity, their religious identity, and others that come along with that. By understanding those, in addition to your ability to look at body language; tonal fluctuations, not even your words, not even the words that are spoken, tonal fluctuations; body language, from the smallest twitch of the eyebrow, to hand gestures, to the way they're sitting, to the way they're looking at you, all have an impact on the accuracy of information that's being assessed. So that you would be able to cultivate that information in order to be able to convert it to knowledge or intelligence. So whether you're in a security arena, trying to develop proper approaches to either forecasting short, mid, long term, or come up with strategic endeavors, and then tactics under them, it's important to understand the nuance. Because much of what exists there especially, in comparison to here in the US, the bulk of what's important exists between the two lines. So if you're looking at the lines of a page, you go line by line by line, it's very clear. But what really needs to be understood is what exists between those two that you don't see. Because that's what influences relationships between individuals, between government officials, government and informal networks, and how they perceive things.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. It seems to me that that is a very compelling statement, but it's also a very worrying statement, in that, actually, to get to that level of sophisticated understanding, you need either to be from that culture or subculture, so you really understand it instinctively, because that's where you probably would detect the flick of the eye, the tonal shift in voice and so on, because you've grown with it. You've understood it from birth. As you were learning your language, you were learning it with those influences as culture. But how do we get a security apparatus from another part of the world, a different culture, to a place where it can at least be sufficiently competent in these important matters? I agree with you, in between the bullets, in between the lines, the unspoken word is really the guide to what's really being said. But how do you teach that? How do you learn that? Or do you have to have somebody from first language, first culture, and firsthand, wherever possible?

Satgin Hamrah: That's a really good question. So the best way to do it is either from someone from there, or someone who has been immersed in that environment, because some things only come with time and experience. Or even someone who's married to somebody from there, and is deeply immersed in that culture. Because, then, through time, you pick up patterns of understanding of those basic nuances that you don't see. It would be difficult to see, and without, I would say, unintentional cultural bias, right?

Harry Kemsley: Yeah.

Satgin Hamrah: So it's not intentional that you don't see them because you're still looking at certain behaviors through the lens by which you've been raised, or the environment in which you've been mostly acclimated to. So I think those would be the three levels. Because you can teach it in a textbook, and so your accuracy levels will increase, but there's levels of complexity there that's also related to perceptions of history, and time, and geographic space. And, for example, if you're looking at... I'm studying the Iran- Iraq War as part of my dissertation, for example, how that war has influenced different segments of both countries vastly differently. And then how that has influenced time, and space, and perceptions, and historical understanding in terms of their current identity. And when they speak, their tonal fluctuations, and how the eyes light up, and they don't. You will end up seeing a lot more than what is spoken, in terms of their belief systems, their perceptions of the past and the future. So going back to the question you asked, only somebody who's been immersed in that environment for an extended period of time would be able to, I think, put those pieces together to understand the granular levels that are very difficult to learn from a book.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. And, Sean, we've spoken about this tangentially before, in the open source environment, I can bring people into an organization, an intelligence community, with a diverse background, perhaps diverse history in terms of where they've lived, who they're married to, or whatever. But trying to get those people inside the security installations where clearances would be required is a significant challenge, isn't it?

Sean Corbett: It is, and it is a great discriminator for, if you want to call it the open source world, because you can use those people that are never going to get the clearances. But just going back to what Satgin said, it really resonates with me. So personal experience, out in Afghanistan, where it didn't happen to me often because I was normally behind the wire and all the rest of it, but sitting on a inaudible with village elders. We didn't know who they were. And before the coolants in particular, we used to have interpreters with us. And you'd have a conversation, it would take time. So you'd ask them questions, and they'd answer. And there was at least twice when I went back saying, " Oh, they're entirely... Just the elders, they're fine." And the interpreter, even though he'd faithfully reproduced what they said, and there was nothing in it went, " They are Taliban." All the things that Satgin was saying that we couldn't possibly have got those little tiny nuances, even the way they wore some of their clothing was just those little bits and pieces. Now, the guys did get better in time, but they still didn't have that nuance. And it wasn't because of what they said, it was how their demeanor was. So it absolutely resonates with me.

Harry Kemsley: I am fascinated by this topic, and I'm fascinated for two reasons. One, because I think it's a consideration that is seldom thought about when intelligence is done, or perhaps the word seldom is overstating it. It's not done enough. But I sense from the way you described it, Satgin, this is something that if you get it wrong, if you misinterpret what you're seeing, you'll react completely inappropriately. Are there any examples you can give of where you know that there's been a misunderstanding culturally that's driven a distinct, inappropriate, got there eventually, inappropriate reaction to what people were seeing? Can you think of any examples of that?

Satgin Hamrah: The first example that pops to mind goes back to my dissertation, the Iran- Iraq War, that the engagement, the assessment of the landscape by Iraq. The assessment of the landscape of what would transpire after the invasion, because there was so much disconnect between much of the population and the emerging government. The opinion was that they would go in, and the new regime would falter. It did not falter. And one reason it did not falter is because they joined together in order to fight the outsider, even if they disliked the regime that was trying to get its bearings. So that would be the first thing that comes to mind in terms of not truly understanding the culture of a location.

Harry Kemsley: Right, right. Now, if we then use Iran as a case study, let's turn to that. I know that this is a matter that you have a great deal of personal, direct experience in. Can you help me understand how, in Iran, culturally, they see the world? And then, therefore, what does that mean in terms of the way they react, they engage with the external world, the external influences, perhaps, trying to be brought to bear into their country?

Satgin Hamrah: So I think when you're looking at Iran, there is no singular they. Singular they, I don't think has existed for decades, even going back before the revolution. But especially now, the singular they does not exist. So you have to break it down into sections. So the general population's viewpoint, perspective, of the outside world, and this now versus during the war. So now is that they would like to be a normal country, interact normally, have people visit the country, them to be able to leave, just to engage in normal behavior. Are they not friendly with the West? No, they're probably more friendly with the West than one would assume, despite what you see out in the street. Although, having said that, even what you see in the streets, or in the restaurants, is indicative of that. So then you have a different aspect of the they. So they then becomes in more individuals that are hyper conservative. But even within that realm, what they are we speaking about? Is it the they that is worried about a decrease in Islamic nuances or laws within the country? Or is it a they that believes in certain factors, but also is friendly to the West? Because it wants more opportunities, and more food on the table, and more growth for their family. So they there is very difficult. And then you have government officials, even within government or security arena, there is no singular they. It's a very factionalized country. So then, before the idea was, during the Shah's period, the assumption is, okay, you have the elite class, they're definitely friendly to the West. And then you have the lower class, who's more friendly to more Islamist ideologies. There is more stark contrast available then than there is now. The bridges between what you see on the outside and what actually exists in the background is very difficult to really ascertain, unless you dive deep into it. But so there is no singular. I think I'm hitting a cul- de- sac, but there is no singular they there, unfortunately, to make it easier to peel it apart.

Harry Kemsley: And, of course, you're always looking, aren't you, Sean, for simple rules of thumb to guide thinking? Because a complex animal is difficult to deal with. So if you can just simplify it down to a singular they, they're Islamic, therefore, then it makes life much easier. But isn't that actually the root cause, perhaps, of some of the most ridiculous decisions that were made in terms of-

Sean Corbett: It absolutely 100% is. It's so easy to demonize an entire society. But, equally, just what Satgin said, just latching on that for a second, that any society, anywhere, if you've got an external factor that's going to try and undo your culture, you're going to support your own leadership, no matter what. And I think it's a mistake that we've made time and time and again, " Oh, it's okay because there's such a dictatorship in whichever country, it'll get overthrown internally." When if you really get into the detail, if it's an either or, they'll probably go with what they know. And then it does depend on the perspective of the individual. I'll go back, I don't know if I've mentioned this before, but I was lucky enough to be engaged in a think tank in Jordan when ISIS was at their prime. And the idea was bringing all the regional partners together to, how do we get rid of this evil? And to my surprise, there was an Iranian academic that was invited. And I was expecting this person with horns, and a rucksack, and a belt, and all the rest of it. The most charming guy you've ever seen, really articulate, very clever. And so I made sure I sat next to him, just to get some perspective. And he said, " Right, Sean." He said, " What you don't realize is that we..." And we in the government, clearly, because he had been sent there with... " We actually believe in the revolution. We believe in being the custody of the Shi'a faith. And by the way, here's a map of the world with Iran in the center. We are surrounded by people that do not believe that way, so we're defending ourselves." Now, obviously, a lot of that was propaganda and all the rest, but I'm pretty convinced he believed it. But hadn't looked at it through his lens before. So you've got to be so careful with, as I said before, demonizing people, but also in just taking, again, that Western lens. Because it's easy to say, " These are the bad guys. These are the good guys."

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. Satgin, let me just take us a little bit further down this track, if I may. So we have a new administration in the United States. One that, I'm going to be very simplistic here, is taking a stand for United States' position in the world. You can interpret that however you want. But, essentially, is standing up for itself for the way it's being portrayed. And that it will take a hard line with some of its potential adversaries, such as Iran. I think what I've heard from you is that if Iran is pushed hard culturally, as has happened before when Iraq war was happening, they may well bond together, rather than actually fall apart. Is that a fair statement, or is that not a fair statement?

Satgin Hamrah: It depends.

Harry Kemsley: Again, I'm using the word they again as if it's a uniform mass. But the nation made up of many subcultures, if they were pressed too hard, would they not want to stand, to Sean's point, and defend themselves, rather than give up-

Satgin Hamrah: It depends how they're being pressed. I'm so sorry. It depends on how they're being pressed. So if you go in through, and if an entity was to go into the country and hurt the territorial integrity, people, civilians, individuals, would start dying. Then that's not indicative of a desire to keep. That doesn't mean it's not indicative of their agreement with everything that the government is doing. It's indicative, and this is what I found with the war, it's indicative of a desire to not have someone come into their house. And not have their neighbors, especially with the experience of the Iran- Iraq War, not have, and excuse me for being blunt, not have their neighbors blown up, for example. And not have a province taken over again. And that goes back to the memory of the war. So depends on how a foreign entity engages in that. So the they is a lot of people in Iran, while they might have respect for their Shi'a identity, they're not religious. So they might have respect, and you might see certain behaviors, but in truth, while the respect might be there, the deep faith isn't there. The desire for the status quo to continue in the way that it has is not there. So if a change process was undertaken, it would depend on how that change process was undertaken. For a change process to be very fruitful, again, if someone comes in, the view is they would, and this is what I have found with my interviews, if someone comes knocking on my door... This is what one person said. " Knocking on my door and they're coming into mass, I don't care if I'm fighting with my dad, and I hate his guts. At that moment, I'm going to be working with my dad, my mom, and my siblings to try to make sure that person doesn't enter." And once they're out of my house, then we can go back to squabbling. And that was the example that I was given by somebody who lived there during that time period. So that is the process. But then if someone was engaging in endeavors that was not as overtly forceful, the process might be different.

Harry Kemsley: Right. That's a very interesting observation, in terms of, press me too hard, knock on my door, and I don't care who I'm fighting with inside, we will all defend ourselves. We might go back to fighting once you've gone, but we'll defend ourselves. And by the way, I have to say, that does resonate with me as well.

Sean Corbett: With other cultures as well, yeah, absolutely.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. And I wonder whether if there was a Ukrainian on the call, they would be saying essentially the same thing. We have a reason why we're fighting so hard for so long.

Sean Corbett: Quite probably, yeah, absolutely.

Harry Kemsley: Sorry, Sean, go ahead.

Sean Corbett: No, no, no.

Harry Kemsley: So I think what I would like to do for the audience then is look forward a little bit into the coming period of time. And nobody knows exactly what's going to happen in the future, of course. But if we could look forward, what do you think the regime's position is likely to be in a period of time? If, culturally, the nation is likely to come together in the opposition of an affront to the nation by imposing something unreasonable, an invasion, or a destruction of something important to the nation, then perhaps the regime is more likely to persist. What you've suggested is that, depending on how the change was approached, there was potentially more chance of a regime change. What's your view of that? How does that work culturally for the Iranian nation?

Satgin Hamrah: So that's intense. So it depends on, again, so I'm going to go piggyback to what I had said earlier in terms of the perception of time and culture. So I'm going to break it down into parts. So on a state level, for example, if such an endeavor is happening, the view of the perception and utilization of time varies than it does for many Western countries. So understanding that they're in a dynamic threat landscape, and they are arguably in a weaker state today than they were a year ago, the concept and their perception of time illustrates that they will not react quickly. Because it is an ancient culture, an ancient country, just like China and some of these, their strategic planning is very different than here. So they examine where they're going to be in five years, and 10 years, and 50 years, and 100 years. So the way they map it out, it varies. And I'm certain they know that there are a lot of external actors would prefer if they aren't there. And with the Mahsa Amini protests, it's very clear that, while there are individuals in the country that would like them to stay, they're also a great many that don't feel that way, right?

Harry Kemsley: Yeah.

Satgin Hamrah: So they are adjusting according to that, and the concept of time comes in. And then you have the concept of the intersection of history, memory, trauma, and culture, going back to the eight years of the Iran- Iraq War. So, again, if something is to happen that targets civilian populations, or the territorial integrity, yes, they have a Sacred Defense Cinema, that's very different, that's state sponsored. But then you have the intersection of a memory, trauma, culture, and history, that will come to the forefront because there are still people who lived through that time. And that timeframe, and the experiences they had, will be cultivated and utilized to create a strong stance against, if there is anything that happens in terms of physical integrity, or civilian populations being targeted.

Harry Kemsley: I get that. I get that. And thank you. I think what I want to take away from this then is... And I think this idea of the timeframe is fascinating. I'm reminded of a conversation I had with a very senior member of one of the families in the Middle East, the royal families, who I was very gently berating for the fact that he was late. I'll say that with the absolute respect to the fact that he was a member of the family. But he turned to me and smiled in the way that a parent would do to a child, and said, " Yes, Harry, that's very interesting, but when you measure time in millennia, you can't be late for a few minutes." And it's a very interesting cultural statement that he was making there. " You're rushing, Harry, calm down." But what you're saying is that, actually, when you measure time in five, 10, 100 year blocks, the instant on communications that we work in the West are almost irrelevant. They're just a noise in the background. They don't actually affect the way you're thinking, which is a fascinating insight.

Sean Corbett: Yeah. It's like that apocryphal story with the Taliban saying, " You Westerners, you have your watches, but we have time."

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, yeah. And it's probably statements like that, Satgin, you're highlighting that we just don't appreciate the significance of. It's much deeper than just a throwaway one- liner. We're assuming it's an advertising bumper sticker. Actually, no, it's trying to give you some clues, Westerner, that this is our culture. This is how we think about it.

Satgin Hamrah: It's not just Iran or Middle East, but China does the same thing. The concept of time and history and culture is quite different than the way we think about it here in the US, for example. So their strategic outlook, and the tactics that they develop, are in accordance to that, while taking into consideration what Western approaches are. And that's the same perspective that occurs in Iran and in other countries in the region.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, interesting.

Sean Corbett: So there's a whole new podcast here, in terms of has the West lost the ability to develop and put forward strategy? Because that does take time. Do we think in four- and five- year blocks now? Because it's short-termist, and it's all about the political process, as opposed to thinking long- term and what we're trying to achieve. But that's for another day.

Harry Kemsley: Make that on the list. So, Satgin, we've talked about the cultural influences. What about the transnational cultural influences?

Satgin Hamrah: So if it's historical, it goes back to centuries of interaction with one another. For example, Iran's relationship today with India and Pakistan, it goes back to their open borders. They interacted with each other for centuries. And there are nuances of cultural understanding and familiarity there that really transcend any conflicts or any restrictions that exist because they go back hundreds of hundreds of years where they would live in each other's countries, and they would interact with each other on diplomatic and business issues. Then you have more modern angles. And that would be through, very simple, poetry. That's one, and I'll give you an example of that. A book of poetry of Hafez, or Saudi, or Khayyat, if you go there, those books are given to each other as gifts from heads of state to one another because there's a level of cultural understanding there that binds them through those words. And then you have other centers that are opened, and academic exchanges, or there's a huge umbrella of how this occurs. And so that creates a sense of common bond through also shared cultural history, whether it's through those... Go ahead, I'm sorry.

Harry Kemsley: Presumably, those transnational links that you're describing, they transcend the current way we draw the maps, for example. The border is here, I understand, but also, presumably, then, that enables a level of diplomacy and conflict resolution because you're able to reach back into your historical cultural links. You're able to talk about the fact, " Look, yes, we're fighting, but we're ultimately brothers. We've been brothers for centuries. Let's find a way." I guess what you're saying is that that transnational cultural link is actually not only about bonding across current national borders, but also about resolution of conflict.

Satgin Hamrah: It could be resolution of conflict, or it could be working with each other to advance each other's interests. It could be from a political level, from an economic level. But those, they exist, even today. So if you're, for example, working with examining Iran's relationship with Pakistan, or Iran's relationship with India, it transcends the bounds of time because there's that layer under there. Or when you're looking at it with Iran's relationship with states in The Caucasus, there's a level of threads of common culture, threads. Again, it's that nuance that exists. And some shared historical perceptions that also exist between them as well. And it's not just Iran, I think it's in a wider region. But if you're looking at it from an Iran lens, depends on which side you're working with. So if you're looking culturally, if you're looking religiously, it depends on what... To its east, to its west, to its north, exactly how you're looking at the map.

Harry Kemsley: And, Sean, what I'm thinking is, I can imagine an analyst staring at a map, looking at how two entities are now apparently working together, but you don't understand how that can possibly be. Because they have different political systems, there are different geographical areas. Why would they be working? Because you don't understand their history.

Sean Corbett: And underscoring culture that binds them together. You wouldn't necessarily know that, possibly.

Harry Kemsley: You'd be looking for a motivation that was today, when, actually, it's not rooted in today, it's rooted in centuries of relationship by religion, by poetry, by whatever. But it's that lack of understanding that would prevent you from really appreciating what was actually going on. And then, of course, you'd immediately start to react in all the wrong ways.

Sean Corbett: Exactly that. It's the standard way that we look at things, very transactional perspective, as opposed to stuff that's deeper.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, measure time in millennia.

Sean Corbett: This is fascinating stuff.

Harry Kemsley: Satgin, I think, in terms of what I wanted to do today to highlight this really important aspect of culture, we've hit all the high marks. I really feel as though we've opened this up. But we're in danger now of disappearing into a four- or five- hour podcast, which is where I want to take it. So let's not go into that version of this podcast yet. Let me ask you a question though for the audience. Given the importance of culture, which I think you've exposed extremely well in the last 25 or so minutes, if you had one thing to say to the audience that relates to this importance of culture for them to take away... And let's assume, by the way, the audience we're talking to here is either academic, or perhaps national security related. What's the one thing that you'd want them to take away from this conversation?

Satgin Hamrah: The one thing I would like to have them take away from this conversation is focus, understand the black and white, but focus significantly more on the intangible, on the nuances that exist. If you want to look at it from the military perspective, for example, or the security perspective, I'm going to go back again and give an example of something that Iran used during the Iran- Iraq War. And that is the Battle of Karbala. The Battle of Karbala already happened. You can't go back. You can't collapse time, and make the two emerge together in a singular lens, right?

Harry Kemsley: Mm- hmm.

Satgin Hamrah: But it's the gray zone of what that meant for the people, whether they were secular or not, secular or religious. It's used in murals, and postcards, and posters, in its songs, as a strategy. And what it did to a segment of the population, this burning fire of this intangible sense of this battle that happened so many years ago, and how it gave this fire to them to go fight. And in all likelihood, they knew they were going to die. But what drove them to do it? Karbala didn't exist in that time period. Paradise was not Karbala, but they were used in parallel. So where did it come from? Why was it so moving? It was moving, and those concepts are still used today throughout the world, not just in Iran or the Muslim world. So it's that intangible nuance that exists, that attaches, that has highly emotive qualities that perhaps plays with one's logic as well that can move people forward. So if you're looking at it on a state level, or on a non- state level, for example, ISIS, we were talking about earlier, these are the factors of cultures and subcultures, the intangible, the nuances, the things that exist between the two lines, that are very important. If you really want to engage with open source information to turn it into intelligence, or so that you don't have cultural bias, so that you can really create strong short- term and long- term strategies and tactics to move forward in a more effective manner. You have to understand those people truly in order to be able to assess them and engage with them in a way that's beneficial. It could be a diplomat, or it could be an asset, or it could be a business owner, dealing with business intelligence. These are factors that are highly important.

Harry Kemsley: Perfect. Sean?

Sean Corbett: I'm not sure I can follow that. That was outstanding. But what I would say, and going back to the basics, the 101 for me is that, and it comes back to your introduction, actually, Harry, that we need to look at the ethereal, the ethics and the empathy. I would argue that culture is far more, not important because they're all important, but central to understanding for an analyst. If you don't understand the culture, you're never going to come up with a very effective so what, what if? So this is absolutely core business, I believe. And we, in the West, need to do it better.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, I agree with all of that. And I also want to underscore what Sean just said. That was an outstanding one- liner takeaway, Satgin, thank you.

Satgin Hamrah: Thank you.

Harry Kemsley: I think what I would add to that is, if I now combine what I've learned from this podcast about the centrality, to use Sean's word, of this cultural perspective, and the need for a deep understanding, if I add that to the mis- and disinformation, gray wars that we keep talking about, I wonder how much we would reinterpret if we actually understood the culture of those that were doing what they're doing in the information realm, in terms of mis- and disinformation. It's a separate conversation, but I do wonder whether we misinterpret some of the things we see as disinformation when actually they're well- meant. They're well- meaning, actually, they're not trying to be disinformation, they're trying to actually convey a slightly different narrative. But, again, that's off the thrust of this podcast. Satgin, let me pause us there because I can feel that urge to drive into the next two or three hours of our lives to get this really, really developed. And I'll pause there because our listeners, no doubt, will be happy to come back on a second or third bite of this, by saying thank you. I've really, really enjoyed this conversation. And I really would like to come back and revisit some of the aspects that we've touched on, and then use those as more in- depth conversations for the future. So, again, thank you. I'm very grateful for your time today.

Satgin Hamrah: No, it's been my pleasure. It's been a wonderful experience, and a great honor to be here with you both today, and to have an opportunity to discuss this.

Harry Kemsley: Thank you very much indeed. Well, to our listeners, thank you for taking the time. As ever, we are very, very open to comment and questions. And if anybody would like to identify any part of this podcast they would like us to dig deeper into, we'd happily consider that. And, Satgin, if you would grace us for a second, or even a third time on this podcast, we'll happily dig further. But thank you for now. Thank you.

Speaker 1: Thanks for joining us this week on The World of intelligence. Make sure to visit our website, janes. com/ podcast, where you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or Google Podcasts, so you'll never miss an episode.