Speaker 1: ...Welcome to the World of Intelligence. A podcast for you to discover the latest analysis of global military and security trends within the open source defense intelligence community. Now, onto the episode with your host, Harry Kemsley.

Harry Kemsley: Hello, and welcome to this edition of World of Intelligence at Janes, by your host Harry Kemsley, and as usual, my co- host, Sean Corbett, I'm with here. Hi. Sean, we've spoken in the past about intelligence being one of those art forms, and supported by science, trying to look into the crystal ball, the future gazing, predictive analysis. So I thought today we might spend a bit of time looking at a particularly interesting area, China, Taiwan. With a question of, is China going to invade Taiwan? And if so, how could we predict that that was the case? Now, you've been in this world even longer than I have, Sean, just how important is the China/ Taiwan issue strategically?

Sean Corbett: So incredibly. I mean, it's probably what many of the strategic thinkers will be considering, and government, particularly in the U. S., but elsewhere as well. It really is one of the most important issues of our time. And so being able to predict it is, as I think you mentioned the word there, the nirvana for the intelligence community. As my old very distinguished boss used to say, " Don't read the newspaper, don't even tell me what's going on, tell me what's going to happen." And it's a difficult thing to do.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. We've been talking in the past about the move from descriptive analytics, which I guess is the bit about reading newspaper, through to predictive analytics, and that's what we're going to try and discuss today around the Taiwan/ China case study. And to do that, we've invited back a couple of guests who've spoken before on the podcast, Javi as one of our China experts. Hey, Javi. How are you doing?

F Xavier Casals: Hi, Harry. Happy to be here.

Harry Kemsley: Good. And Claire, Claire Chu. Hello, Claire.

Claire Chu: Hi. Thanks for having me.

Harry Kemsley: Great to have you both back for your second, or possibly third helping, I think, for one of you. Anyway, great to have you here. What I wanted to focus on to start with is, Claire, I might get you in a second, just to give us a sense of what is the current context here at the back end of 2024 into early 25. What is the current context from your understanding of the China/ Taiwan dynamic? Once you've done that for us, Claire, I'm going to turn to you Javi to if you want to add anything to that, but then take us on to the piece of work that's actually going to be the centerpiece of this podcast episode, which is the work you've been doing on starting to understand what might well become a model for the indicators and warnings of situation. So Claire, if I could start with you then, what are the current dynamics that are painting the context for us of China/ Taiwan?

Claire Chu: Absolutely. I mean, with the China and Taiwan relationship, for a very long time, the core really been a political relationship, that is affected by economic, financial, diplomatic, military, security, really, a whole host of other factors. And for many years, the military dimension is one that has really led the discussion in Washington and elsewhere. And increasingly, we're seeing more and more folks start to pick up on the key importance of some of the economic and diplomatic elements as well. And so I think what Javi's report does is really dive into this axis of factors that will color the future of Taiwan's security to come. And it's also important to understand that we talk about this potential for invasion, and this potential for a kinetic attack for a contingency or even maritime blockade, but what has been happening for many years has been what could be perceived as war already. It's a war on Taiwan's international legitimacy. It's a war on Taiwan's right to self- determination. It's a war on the Taiwanese people's national will for self- defense. So we're already seeing some level of erosion, and a really targeted attack on all of these other elements of Taiwan's security. And so the military one is really just one of many facets, and I think that's really important to emphasize whenever we're talking about the Taiwan strategic vulnerabilities.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, very good. So if I understood you correctly, Claire, please correct me if I have misdescribed this, are you saying that the China/ Taiwan relationship has been predominantly between them, and economic and other factors, whilst in places like the U.S., it has been described more militarily? Is that what you're saying?

Claire Chu: I think that's correct. I think that has led the discussion, and it's important for analysts to be looking at other dimensions as well.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. Okay. All right, thank you. So Javi, your experience in the China study has been extensive. So what's your perspective on the same? And then perhaps we go straight from that into the indicator warnings model.

F Xavier Casals: No, I fully agree with that. I fully agree with what Claire has just said. And I think that has been a challenge for us as analysts as well, because government, for obvious reasons, seem focus on the military aspect of this conflict, because of the potential consequences of a military conflict, over military conflict between China and Taiwan happening, and how this would affect pretty much everyone when it comes to economics, when it comes to security concerns. However, from our point of view as China analysts, or China watchers, as Claire was saying, there's many other aspects that seem to be either neglected, or I would say they're not assessed to be as important. And what we tried to do from Janes here was bringing everything into the analysis. We didn't want to focus just on the military issue, because at the end of the day, we also understand that war or military conflict is a political activity that you conduct for political objectives. Any state, and China is not different to that, has many means that their disposal to achieve those objectives, military means are just one group of those means.

Harry Kemsley: Right. So if that is the case, I'm just curious, let me tease that out a little bit further, Sean, what I think I'm hearing is that there is an overemphasis, potentially, in some of the analysis that been done in the past around the military dimension, rather than what Claire and Javi are describing, which it could be more multifaceted perspectives of the relationship between China and Taiwan, do you think that's fair?

Sean Corbett: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, it's the classic class fixing model, isn't it? Continuation of diplomacy by the means war. But I go back to the very, very simple equation that threat equals capability, plus intent, plus opportunities. So it's all very well having the intent, which you could argue, is that the case or not? And I know we'll be delving into that.

Harry Kemsley: Sure.

Sean Corbett: But there's a different thing to have the intent, and the capability therefore to do so. And then the opportunity piece comes in about external actors persuading you, again, leading into the capability and the intent, if you've got forces around there just to not to act.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. All right, well, I probably would like to spend more time on that, but I'm going to move us on, because I really don't want to get onto this indicators and warnings model, Javi, that you've created. As we go through these factors that Javi is going to describe, Claire, perhaps I can get you to step in from time to time just to sort of color the factor that's being described as one of those things that I know you can do from your perspective to give it a bit more context, or even more context. Javi, how have you started to think about these many different perspectives of what we could use to help us understand what might happen, the indicators and warnings?

F Xavier Casals: Yes, that's a good question. So this whole project started because we needed to answer this question, is China going to invade Taiwan in the next, in our case, we're looking at the horizon of 6 to 12 months? What we needed to identify were factors or developments that will let us know, or would help us guess that such an operation was being prepared. The assumption is any big military operation will require certain preparation, certain measures to be taken before, and some of them you can observe or you can assess. That's the approach we've taken into this. What we try to bring into the analysis, as we were discussing before, were factors beyond the strictly military developments. Of course, we're talking about military operations, so most factors are going to be political and military, but we try to bring in other factors, such as economic factors too. The way we did that is, we set a number of 9 to 12 indicators. We brainstormed them, we use our expertise, we use previous analysis, and then we also pulled in expertise from other teams, and we organized red team sessions. Claire was part of those red team sessions. It was great to have her, really. And at the end of the day, our final list of indicators as a result of a work of more than 30 analysts from different backgrounds that looked into them.

Harry Kemsley: So what are those indicators that you've selected from that study you did, that workshop you did?

F Xavier Casals: So our main focus, of course, were going to be political and military indicators. For the military indicators, we included the ones probably you would expect, so indicators that would point at immobilization of troops happening, deployment of assets, troops in the areas close to the Taiwan Strait. In our case, we close it down to the Eastern Theater Command, which is one of China's theater commands, and it's the one that deals with Taiwan just across the strait. Military infrastructure, an increase or an uptake in military drills related to Taiwan operations. Those were the military indicators. For the political indicators, we've been tracking Chinese rhetoric, with the assumption that such an operation, an invasion of Taiwan, would require Chinese authorities to change the way they speak about Taiwanese citizens as well.

Harry Kemsley: Right. Let me just pause you there, Sean. I'll come back to you in just a second about the mobilization military, because I'm going to have to assume that that's something that various agencies in the world would be able to see and track very, very closely. Claire, just to come to you though on the political, the rhetoric, have you seen anything that would suggest to you there's been a shift? And by the way, what is the current rhetoric? Is it all about the economics and the relationship, or is it potentially starting to shift? Have you seen anything about the rhetoric from China that might give us a sense of the politics of this is starting to shift?

Claire Chu: Well, when we look at rhetoric, we have to look at... Or we have to determine whether certain statements are targeting a foreign audience, meaning, say, Western governments and decision makers, whether they're targeting Taiwanese citizens, or Taiwanese decision makers, or if they're targeting domestic Chinese population. And I think that's important, because there are certain instances we've observed censorship, that indicate that China may be seeking to manage domestic expectations when it comes to potential kinetic conflict across the Taiwan Straits. We've seen that more recently, the rhetoric has been actually less inflammatory than some may have expected, with President Lai Ching- te's visit to the United States. We also saw that around the time of the Taiwan elections earlier this year as well, when some of the rhetoric was actually more measured, and more, I think, status quo than some expected, compared to, say, Nancy Pelosi's visit, when we saw a sharp escalation of statements from the Chinese government. And I think this says Taiwan... Or when it comes to Taiwan, Beijing doesn't want to instigate too much conversation over topics that it can't do anything about-

Harry Kemsley: Right.

Claire Chu: ...and that it doesn't want to push the envelope on, because then there may be certain expectations, or red lines of the domestic population would be looking to. And because Taiwan is so important to the Chinese government, it's really important to sort of manage what the expectations for what China can do, what China will do, and what Taiwan is to China in this present day and time.

Harry Kemsley: Got it. Thank you, Claire. Sean, so just going back to the question about mobilization, given that... From what Claire's said, to summarize, perhaps overly simplistically, the rhetoric seems to be de- escalatory, at least currently, but even so, presumably in the event that there was a mobilization, or even build up for exercises, that would be tracked to very high level of fidelity, would it not, by Western government's abilities to do so?

Sean Corbett: Yeah, indeed. In some ways, that's the easy bit in terms of watching them mobilize. But you asked the right question there, what are they mobilizing for? Is it exercises? I mean, you saw this in your Ukraine example, where big exercise going on. So you'd expect to forward deploy lots of equipment, you'd expect them to be operating together, combined arms way. But what you need to then work out is, " Okay, is this in order to do something else?" And there are several indicators for that. Firstly, are what we call signature equipment. So there's quite a lot of rare equipment out there, command and control stuff, some the more sophisticated air defense. As soon as you start seeing field hospitals moving-

Harry Kemsley: Right.

Sean Corbett: ...then you take real notice. But what the Chinese tend to do, so in terms of particularly things like encroachments, is, we're seeing a lot with air and air defense activity, is what I call normalizing the abnormal. So incursions into Taiwanese airspace used to be a little bit of, "Hang on, what are they doing here?" They do it so frequently now it just becomes normalized. So then do you see that as an imminent to do something, or is it just normalization? And that's the key, is working out what is just posturing, what is exercising, and what is actually serious.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, I think there's also an element of what Claire just said in terms of messaging. If there was a sense in China that the Chinese were impotent in this particular debate, and that was being sent from a domestic audience, then by posturing, as you put it, by demonstrating their military prowess by huge exercises around the Taiwanese Straits, et cetera, would potentially be an attempt to address that internal narrative. Again, I'd love to dig further on that, but I'm going to come back to you, Javi. So we've talked about the two major indicators, political and military, rhetoric, and mobilization being the obvious indicators. What other factors did you consider in the model?

F Xavier Casals: So in our case, we took into account trade and economics, because China's Eastern facade and Southeast facade plays a vital role in China's economy. Not only because you have economic powerhouses in the provinces that are across the Taiwan Strait, but also because that's where most of the trade, maritime trade, goes through. So there is no scenario where you can cause disturbance around Taiwan where China's economy is not affected.

Harry Kemsley: Right. Right.

F Xavier Casals: So one of the things that we are doing as well is monitoring the value volume of trade that goes into those points.

Harry Kemsley: So if you're looking at maritime traffic going in and out, that could be affected by an exercise? Just to be absolutely clear, you're saying that if you suddenly saw the Chinese restricting, or stopping maritime-

F Xavier Casals: Yeah.

Harry Kemsley: ...navigation through there for its own trade, that would be an indicator that they were preparing for something potentially?

F Xavier Casals: Yeah. Or simply if we saw that trade going into those ports is decreasing, and being shifted towards other safer ports, that would be an indicator as well. It doesn't mean that for an invasion to happen, this condition is necessary, but it happens if you have this change in trade, that surely is indicating-

Harry Kemsley: That something is wrong with by nation, presumably with-

F Xavier Casals: Yes.

Harry Kemsley: ...other indicators. Yeah, Sean?

Sean Corbett: Yeah, I was just going to reinforce. I think the economic aspect is so important, because it's both a cost and a benefit scenario. I read something the other day that said that if they did invade or even blockade Taiwan, it could take something like$ 10 trillion off the global GDP, and a lot of that would actually fall on China themselves.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

Sean Corbett: So bear in mind that China is all about the economy, Belt and Road initiative, all those things, and actually keeping the population in an acceptable way economically, you've got to ask the question there. If that changed in some way, then I think that would be an indicator. So Chinese economy not doing brilliantly right now, although we'd probably wish it was... Our was just as good. If that keeps dropping, you could look at it two ways, either, " Well, we can't afford to do anything now." Or, the usual thing is, " Right, let's lash out somewhere else, so that we're not looking internally."

Harry Kemsley: inaudible.

Sean Corbett: So it's such an important dynamic, but it's not a simple one. I'm sure Claire will have something to say on that one.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. Claire, I'm just curious about your thoughts on this maritime element of the economics. I mean, just how big an issue for China is this? You mentioned earlier that the Chinese perspective is probably dominated by the economics, a couple of other things as well before military. So just how big an impact would this have on China if they were to act on their economy?

Claire Chu: Yeah, I mean, there are, I think, two schools of thought on this right now when you're looking at China domestically, and again, China's core stability and security is really the primary interest of the CCP, and the borders, including Taiwan, are also key interests, but they are, in a way, secondary, or supplementary to internal stability and regime security. So with that in mind, right now in China, wealth is shrinking, capital is fleeing, companies are going bankrupt, unemployment is up, there is deflation. And so with this context, there are some analysts who believe that China may hold off on greater escalation, because for the average citizen in China, Taiwan is really going to be a secondary, if not, a very low concern. There are other folks, other analysts who are watching the situation, and think that maybe saber- rattling is going to be actually a response to the poor economy. I think there are some different ways to watch this, and looking at it through this lens of indicators, and tracking these indicators through time, I think is good observation, in concert with other indicators on the military side, where economic decline, or robust economy may lead Chinese decision makers.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. I think it's a really important point, that tracking this over time, seeing the connections between these things is such an important part of any intelligence analysis, particularly of this nature. So, Javi, just to come back to you, we've talked about political, military, trade and economics. We've mentioned a moment ago how these things might play together. Sean, you talked about opportunity being one of the parts of threat. The maritime ports that will get shifted to other ports, maybe that's providing an opportunity. The saber- rattling they might need to do for internal consumption might be preventing us from seeing a sort of rhetoric rise potentially. I'm trying to combine these things as we go through. But what other factors that are we going to consider then? We talked about those three, and how they may start to play together, what other factors we're considering in the model?

F Xavier Casals: So for example, in the economic side of our indicators, one of the things we're taking into account is stockpiles of key resources.

Harry Kemsley: Stockpiles?

F Xavier Casals: Yeah.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: The assumption is, if China takes any offensive action, this will trigger specifically Western powers, and US and US- aligned powers to apply sanctions on China.

Harry Kemsley: And we saw that with Russia, right?

F Xavier Casals: Yeah.

Harry Kemsley: And they've been great. Yeah.

F Xavier Casals: And we're pretty sure that that's also something that the Communist Party of China is thinking about. So if they decide to launch any sort of operation, they will very likely attempt to sanction proof as much as they can certain resources through increasing the stockpiles of those resources, or making sure that they are, again, shifting the source of import to guarantee that at least those sources will not be as vulnerable to sanctions, as they may be now thinking, for example, about energy from... Thinking about Russia, or any of these countries that would feel safer for China. Right now, for example, when we look at grain imports, most of them come from US- aligned countries, and NATO inaudible countries.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: So in our case, that is a low level of concern when we look at this. When it comes to issuing warning, that indicator is not pushing us to say, " Well, they are going to do something big." Let's say. Speaking plainly in the next 6 to 12 months, because they still rely on the countries that will almost certainly support sanctions against China.

Harry Kemsley: Sure. So the stockpiles, how easy would it be to track stockpiles? I mean, grain shipments from aligned countries, relatively straightforward, I suppose, but I mean, military stockpiles... I'll come to you in a second, Sean, in terms of... Without giving away you shouldn't, but the ability to actually track stockpiling. I recognize it as a subordinate, lower indicator than perhaps the political rhetoric might be, but how easy is it actually to track that?

F Xavier Casals: The answer is it depends. Some of them are relatively well- known, because China shares data with international institutions, and I've double- checked that, or because a Chinese government itself has an interest in making sure, or publicizing that they are well- stocked when it comes to-

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: ...inaudible full security. In other cases when it comes, for example, to oil stockpiles, well, there's no way for us... Not for certain, that's a lower confidence indicator. We have to deal with those challenges as well.

Harry Kemsley: And Sean, do we have any sense of how clear we, the Western governments, would be on stockpiling, particularly in the military side-

Sean Corbett: Yeah. From any perspective, if we're looking at it, yes.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

Sean Corbett: I mean, there's all sorts of things. You can use satellite imagery to do volumetric analysis if stuff's being stored outside. Coal for example, all the rest of it. Oil's slightly more difficult, as you said, because you might have loads of PLL tanks, but you don't know if they're full or not. But then you can track oil tankers' chipping with AIS. Yes, there is ghost chipping, all the rest of it. But generally, if they're building warehouses, all that sort of stuff, you'll have a fairly good handle whether they're building up their logistic supplies, or their... Sorry, their raw material supply. It is an indicator, but it's by no means-

Harry Kemsley: A strong one?

Sean Corbett: Yeah.

Harry Kemsley: All right. Javi, I'm going come back to you then. So we've got two sub- indicators there under the trade and economic banner. What else are we adding to the list of things we're going to look at to try and get this picture?

F Xavier Casals: I think one of the indicators that maybe I like the most, the personal level, because I think it's often overlooked, is looking at what Taiwan is doing. I think one of the issues sometimes is that we tend to frame this a sort of conflict between China and the U.S., where Taiwan has no agency, all the Taiwanese are sort of a side actor, even if it's them that we are talking about.

Harry Kemsley: Are you saying that we... They don't have a vote in this? They don't have a place to play in it?

F Xavier Casals: Sometimes I think they do, of course. But I think sometimes, depending on the analysis that you read, it feels like it's just the inaudible choice, and then the U. S. armed force's choice and allies-

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: ...to decide-

Harry Kemsley: They're just in the way of a conflict.

F Xavier Casals: Yeah, they just happens to be there.

Harry Kemsley: And Claire, I'm going to come to you in just a second in terms of your perspective on the Taiwanese population and their view, if you could give us a thought about that in a minute. Because I think that's one of those things that often isn't discussed. What do the Taiwanese people feel? Are they staunching against the idea of being back with China or not? But let me come back to that in a moment. So, back to you.

F Xavier Casals: Yeah, so one of the indicators that we have is the actions taken by the Taiwanese government. Our assumption is, there's a good chance that the Taiwanese government will know earlier and better than us if something is brewing, let's say. So we've been looking at war preparedness campaigns, we've been looking at war guidelines that might have been issued for the civilian population in case of a war, or in case of military conflict. And again, that indicator is taken into account with the other 10 indicators that we have. So it's not that we're going to make our assessment only based on this one, but this helps us get a better picture as we look at what people literally across the street are doing.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, I think the assumption that they probably know more about this than those staff in London, is a very clear assumption.

F Xavier Casals: Yeah.

Harry Kemsley: But we've also seen this war preparedness happening, haven't we? In Scandinavia, where the Norwegians and the Swedes have issued... Or reissued, probably better said, guidance to the population about actions upon the event of war. Coming back to you, Claire, if I may, if it's not an unfair question, what do you think the perspective on the streets of Taiwan are about this whole debate?

Claire Chu: Well, broadly, Taiwanese people aren't very easily rattled, and I think like people anywhere else, when Taiwanese go to the polls, the key issues are largely bread and butter issues at the end of the day. We saw in the last election cycle too, a lot of the issues had to do with... I mean, actually capital punishment was up on the list. Wages, cost of living, cost of housing were really key issues people were voting on. And China was, I guess in a way, on a ballot as well. China came up at rallies, and political speeches. You see the Kuomintang party favors diplomacy engagement as a means to prevent conflict and war with China. Whereas the DPP, the Democratic Progressive Party favors more of a whole of society of resilience approach to counter potential Chinese aggression. But at the end of the day, even though both parties have very different approaches, and very different demographics, they are really both working towards preventing war and conflict. But at the end of the day though, that is one of many issues that Taiwanese generationally have been dealing with for, well, again, generations. It's not an everyday issue.

Harry Kemsley: It doesn't sound like a new issue. And I like that-

Claire Chu: Right.

Harry Kemsley: ...word, resilience. Also, I like the reflection you've made of how during recent elections, the China/ Taiwan issue didn't come up as a strong vote determinant, which is in itself an indicator, I guess. Thank you, Claire. Just coming back to you then, Sean, Javi, do you want to interject?

Sean Corbett: No, no. I was just going to bearing in mind that time is getting on, and maybe some of you're going to come on this, but actually identifying the factors itself is particularly the way we've done it, using several different perspectives from different analysts who know this stuff. The key though is weighting the factors. And so when you bring them all together, what does it mean?

Harry Kemsley: Yeah.

Sean Corbett: Because the actual factors themselves are relatively straightforward.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. Are there any other factors that you'd particularly want to highlight? I know you said you liked the inaudible, which I hadn't thought of. So yeah, I like that one too. But are there any others before we jump to the weighting question, which Sean quite rightly raises?

F Xavier Casals: I think we're fine with the ones that we've mentioned, because the others are the classic military factors we've already discussed. We've talked about war rhetoric as well. And I'm just going through this very quickly, I think we've covered the main one.

Harry Kemsley: All right. Okay, well, that then said, then let's move on to how you weight them. You've said several times during that, that, " Here are a couple of powerful indicators, and here are less powerful indicators." How do you weight them?

F Xavier Casals: So that is a very good question, and I think that is a challenging process. What we did is, we gathered a group of analysts, and we used structured analytical technique with Nick, so as it is, to allow us to find a method to weigh the indicators. The way we did it is, we compared each individually, each of the analysts present there, with each indicator against all the others, and we had to pick one each time, and then decide a factor for that difference. So let's say I was comparing indicator A with indicator B, I had to decide which one was A, which one... Sorry, which one was the heavier, the struggle of the two-

Harry Kemsley: Okay.

F Xavier Casals: ...and then by a factor of one.

Harry Kemsley: Okay.

F Xavier Casals: I think we have three. We get one, two, or three.

Harry Kemsley: So you go through a series of analyses like that, you start to understand how expert analysts view the relative weighting, and you do that over enough turns of the handle-

F Xavier Casals: Yeah.

Harry Kemsley: ... supposing you'vegot a mean position of relative weighting?

F Xavier Casals: Yeah. And what we found at the end of this process is that for seven of those 11 indicators, we had the same ranking across all of the analysts. So we were happy with that. So for example, we all agreed that mobilization of troops was a strong indicator.

Harry Kemsley: Sure.

F Xavier Casals: Some others though, we had a bit of a difference. That's where qualitative discussion entered the game.

Harry Kemsley: A healthy debate was had.

F Xavier Casals: Yes. Yes. Everyone survived. And then we just red teamed those internally, and-

Harry Kemsley: Right. And I think, Claire, you were involved in the red teaming. Were you involved in this waiting debate as well?

Claire Chu: No, not so much. But I think it sounds like a great methodology to, as we mentioned before, not just keep tabs on those indicators, but really keep tabs on them and their importance over time.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, and presumably, Javi, as we go through, we'll start to look at those weightings as events start to occur. We're looking for them to start modeling the world in the future. So if it's not modeling it correctly, I don't mean for an invasion, I mean potentially of other things, that we'll then change those weightings accordingly, presumably.

F Xavier Casals: Yeah, absolutely. So the last step of the process, once we had the indicators, we had our assessment for each of the indicators. Once we had the weighting, was deciding what was going to happen next.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: And what we did is, we drafted five potential scenarios from an all- out invasion, to China's discontinuing, let's say, or abandoning the goal. I don't think it's a spoiler for anyone to say that this last scenario of China abandoning the goal of unification was-

Harry Kemsley: Was a inaudible.

F Xavier Casals: It didn't get much.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah.

F Xavier Casals: But then we pitched each of our assessments for the indicators against each of the scenarios. Probably try to explain that a bit better, imagine a chart, a matrix where you have each row is a different assessment for the indicators, each column is a different scenario. And what we did is, " Okay, this scenario assessment, would that fit this scenario? Yes or no? Would that fit the next scenario? Yes or no?"

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: We did that for the 11 indicators.

Harry Kemsley: So you've profiled the indicators by scenario in a way that allows you to effectively model the types of indicators and the threshold they need to reach for that scenario to become more likely?

F Xavier Casals: And then what you end up having for those five scenarios that we have is, okay, so we have... Let's say three out of the 11 indicators now would fit this scenario. Five of the 11 indicators would fit this other scenario.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: 11 of the 11 indicators would fit scenario four, and zero or one of those indicators would fit scenario five.

Harry Kemsley: Right.

F Xavier Casals: Then, of course, you assess that against the weight of each indicators, because having five weak indicators probably points towards then lower likelihood than having three strong indicators.

Harry Kemsley: Got it. Got it. Okay. So Sean, I'm curious, from your background in the intelligence world, which is extensive, have you ever come across an analysis quite as rigorous as that?

Sean Corbett: So I've spent a lawful lot of time looking at indicators and warnings in my previous existence, and it'd be fair to say we never got it fully right. Because this is-

Harry Kemsley: Sure.

Sean Corbett: ...it's back to the art versus science. I would say that our model probably wasn't as sophisticated, so we'd come up with however many questions, generally about a dozen, so not far off the same. And then a slightly different approach in terms of, if seven of those 12 happens, something's going to happen. If only four happens... So I didn't think we actually got... This is some time ago now, so they might be doing it now, we got to that next level of analysis that Javi's talked about in terms of, okay, weight them and then if these three but those four don't happen, or one, two and seven happens, what does this mean? Which is quite sophisticated.

Harry Kemsley: Sure.

Sean Corbett: But I go back to, it's a great tool, and I commend the work that's been done on this, because you've got to... It's back to showing how your working out. Because if we end up getting an assessment saying in the next six months China's going to invade Taiwan, you've got to be able to really back it up. But I'm not saying that's going to happen by the way, because I know-

Harry Kemsley: inaudible.

Sean Corbett: So the sophistication, the next level analysis it is great. But just one final thing, is that what's really difficult to factor into these models is effectively the will. What is the cost of success, for example. Because, maybe for another time, but it is not particularly straightforward for China to invade Taiwan-

Harry Kemsley: inaudible

Sean Corbett: ...because of all sorts of factors, environmental, geographical, et cetera, et cetera. So what are they prepared to lose? And that's as much at the strategic level... So they lose any standing on the world stage, the economy, as we've already discussed, will go down, but it's a gain- loss... Back to the gain- loss thing. And I'm sure they're looking at the West, and our lack of strategic patience in terms of, they'll get bored soon. So if we take Taiwan, then actually, there'll be lots of haranguing, but within five years, 10 years, if they can stomach that, then maybe it's back to normal again.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah, interesting. All right, well, look, given that time is now starting to evaporate on this, and there are about 10 topics I'd like to spend another hour on, we don't have time for that. Let me just start to pull this conversation around to a takeaway. And as I ask each of you to give the audience your one takeaway you'd like to remember from this, I'm going to ask you Javi, Claire, Sean, to also tell me whether you think there's likely to be an invasion of Taiwan by China in the next 12 months. Okay. So let me start with you in terms of your one takeaway. What's the one thing from all your work you'd like the audience to take away from this?

F Xavier Casals: Well, the main takeaway of the report is, it's very unlikely that China will invade-

Harry Kemsley: Very-

F Xavier Casals: Unlikely.

Harry Kemsley: Unlikely. I didn't hear the un. I'm going to just-

F Xavier Casals: Yeah. It's very unlikely that China will invade Taiwan in the next 6 to 12 months. So that's the headline of our report, that's the takeaway that I'd like to finish with.

Harry Kemsley: Very good. And you answer the question as well. Well, done. Claire?

Claire Chu: I think in addition to understanding what may or may not happen, is to understand what the options are for the U. S. and allied partners that have some level of commitment to Taiwan's freedom and democracy. And by that I mean, there are certain red lines for if there were, again, a kinetic invasion. But what about if the conflict is psychological, and it's economic, and it's financial? What do we do then? We've seen some level of incursion by Chinese, say merchant fleets. Is there a red line that the U. S. has drawn in that situation? And there's not. So I think in addition to understanding these indicators, and tracking, and being able to have this forecasting ability, it's also important to step up, again, the options that are available, and to increasingly reconsider what red lines may look like in a scenario that is so multifaceted, and primarily existing in the gray zone as we see it today.

Harry Kemsley: Yeah. I think It's a really good take away. Thank you, Claire. Sean?

Sean Corbett: Yeah, slightly stole mine there actually about the gray zone-

Harry Kemsley: You said gray zone, Sean. You explained that.

Sean Corbett: ... hybrid warfare,because it's absolutely a great point. It's not an absolute do they invade, don't they. There's so many grays on that. And back to, again, what was said, is that we have a vote on this. I don't know how much of a vote. When I say we, I mean the West, the U. S. in particular. So back to being the cost. But I think the ultimate takeaway though is that predictive analysis has to be where the intelligence analyst has to or tries to get to. And as you've heard me say a million times, it doesn't matter if you're wrong, as long as you're not inaudible wrong. Providing you have given the assumptions, you've given the alternative analysis, and you've given the working out onto why you've come to where you have, because that gives you decision makers, and the policymakers enough to go with, " Okay, on the balance of probability," which is really what we're talking about here, " this is most likely." But we can still factor in all the eventualities, and actually influence those factors as well. So it reduces the number of factors that are as likely to make things happen. So this is not easy, and it's particularly complex. And my answer also is no, they're not going to do it.

Harry Kemsley: I didn't actually ask you, Claire, I'm assuming yours was also a no, Claire?

Claire Chu: No to a kinetic invasion. Yes, to increased coercion and corrosive practices.

Harry Kemsley: That's a good caveat. inaudible

Sean Corbett: Absolutely. Absolutely.

Harry Kemsley: I think my takeaway from this conversation is actually in... It's one takeaway, but it's actually in two parts. One, I think, as Sean just said, the indicator of warnings is a necessary and important part of intelligent process, about helping to reduce the uncertainty. But secondly, linked to that, the uncertainty doesn't have to be just around the military invasion in this environment, the world of dying that we talked about for many decades, diplomatic, et cetera, I don't think it's as simple as a military environment. And I think the point you made right at the beginning, Claire, about the focus of the conversation, the discourse between China and Taiwan is extensively around economics, trade, and so on, cultural. And in the U.S. and in the West, the focus seems to be on the military, and that may well be a misjudgment that we need to be very, very careful about, for the exact reasons you've raised. So it's multifaceted, and maybe we're only focusing on one facet because it's easy to do that. A trigger of a kinetic effect is easy to spot. A trigger that is gray warfare, economic, or diplomatic, or something to do democracy, much more difficult to detect, and to do something about. Well, with that, all I can say is, as usual, Javi, thank you. Claire, thank you again for joining us for a second or third helping. For the audience, I hope you found that as interesting as I did. If you have any questions at all, then please do use the email that you'll see in the link for this podcast to send your questions, and I'll make sure that we'll get some answers back to you if we can. And for now, all I can say is... Sean, I didn't say thank you to you as well. Thank you as always for your contribution.

Sean Corbett: inaudible.

Harry Kemsley: And thank you to the audience for listening. Thank you again. Bye- bye.

Speaker 1: Thanks for joining us this week on the World of Intelligence. Make sure to visit our website, janes. com/ podcast, or you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or Google Podcasts, so you'll never miss an episode.